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Abstract
This paper reconstructs the trajectory of energy efficiency policies in Berlin from the
1920s to today in order to illustrate how the shifting political and socioeconomic
conditions of a city can shape urban energy provision and consumption. Taking a
long-term perspective on the relationship between urban transitions and energy
policy, it investigates how the geo-political turbulence, regime diversity and socio-
economic volatility experienced by 20th-century Berlin influenced strategies of elec-
tricity generation and use in the city. Drawing on different ways of conceptualising
change to socio-technical systems in the literature, the paper’s findings present a
more differentiated picture of urban energy transitions than notions of path depen-
dency and transition pathways imply, highlighting the importance of non-linear
trends, political contestation and crisis discourses in and beyond the city and their
relevance for reconfiguring urban energy systems today.
Keywords: Berlin, energy transitions, socio-technical change, urban
infrastructure
1. Introduction
The shift to a low-carbon society has
become a clarion call for decision-makers
across the globe. Whether to combat cli-
mate change, peak oil, energy insecurity or
rising energy prices, the new policy
paradigm is for a world which is energy effi-
cient and independent of fossil fuels.
Experiences in pursuing this policy goal
suggest that the notion of changing track
from a fossil-based to a post-fossil economy
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is grossly simplistic. Energy transitions are,
in practice, highly complex, non-linear,
contested and spatially diverse phenomena
requiring a sound understanding of the
structures and dynamics which shape sys-
tems of energy provision and use. Scholars
have made significant contributions to
deconstructing oversimplistic notions of
energy transitions. Three of these—relating
to the importance of socio-technical sys-
tems, cities and historical experience—are
central to this paper. Firstly, changes to
energy provision and use are understood not
simply as the application of a new technology,
but as a reordering of the multiple political,
organisational, financial, material and cul-
tural components which constitute a socio-
technical system for energy (Summerton,
1994; Star, 1999). Secondly, cities are today
widely acknowledged as important loci of
(future) energy consumption and key players
of energy and climate change policy, gen-
erating keen interest in the relationship
between socio-technical and urban transi-
tions (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; McFarlane
and Rutherford, 2008; Hodson and Marvin,
2010a, 2010b; Bulkeley et al., 2011b).
Thirdly, research into the historical develop-
ment of our (urban) energy systems has
revealed the importance of path dependen-
cies, discarded alternatives and contingency
in forming today’s socio-technical systems
(Tarr, 1979; Hughes, 1983; Tarr and Dupuy,
1988; Melosi, 2000).
Much of this literature is targeted at
explaining how energy systems change, over
time and in specific contexts (see section 2).
The focus is on specific energy transitions:
how they emerge, are promoted or con-
strained in urban contexts. Conversely, this
paper looks at urban transitions and how
they influence energy policy. Taking the city
of Berlin as an example, it poses the key
question: how did the geo-political turbu-
lence, regime diversity and socioeconomic
volatility experienced by 20th-century
Berlin influence strategies of electricity gen-
eration and use in the city? The paper inves-
tigates what changed—and what did not
change—in the city’s energy policy as a
result of radical and repeated re-ordering of
its political economy. It explores how energy
policy in general—and energy efficiency in
particular—was enrolled to protect the
city’s diverse political systems and respond
to socioeconomic shifts. It seeks to illustrate,
further, how the ‘urban’ of Berlin’s energy
policies was bound up in wider national and
international geo-political contexts.
Rather than focus on a particular energy
technology or socio-technical innovation
introduced at one point in time, the paper
investigates energy efficiency as a more suit-
able issue for revealing shifts and continuities
in energy policy over a long period. It
explores in particular the underlying tension
between the efficient use of energy resources
on the one hand and the efficient use of
energy infrastructures on the other, demon-
strating when and why energy efficiency was
taken up (and discarded) as a policy priority.
The case for selecting Berlin is essentially
two-fold. Firstly, Berlin had by the 1930s
come to symbolise the networked city of
Europe. By virtue of its huge electrical
industry Berlin became known as the
‘Elektropolis’ (Hughes, 1983, p. 177), repre-
senting a model of urban modernity.
Secondly, in the course of the 20th century,
Berlin came to represent less a model than
an exceptional case, characterised by radical
political ruptures and multiple crises. Each
of these crises—whether the Depression,
the Nazi seizure of power, wartime destruc-
tion or political division into East and West
Berlin and subsequent reunification—had a
far-reaching impact on the city’s energy
systems (for historical overviews see
Bewag, 1984; Varchmin and Schubert,
1988). Exploring how infrastructure
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systems—generally renowned for their
inherent stability and path dependency—
were affected by the political turbulence and
diversity of 20th-century Berlin throws into
sharp relief attributes and dynamics of these
socio-technical systems often hidden in
other cities by the patina of familiarity (see
Summerton, 1994).
In line with the other contributions to
this Special Issue, the paper explores the
evolving relationship between cities, urban
change and energy policies. Within this
broad programme, its particular function
lies in addressing three core themes in the
following way. Firstly, it confronts studies
of current transitions with experiences from
the past to illustrate the non-linear, multi-
ple and fluid pathways of urban energy
policy in history (see Hughes, 1983; Melosi
and Pratt, 2007). Secondly, it highlights the
highly political nature of urban energy,
both reflecting and reinforcing power con-
figurations and institutional arrangements
in the city and beyond (see McFarlane and
Rutherford, 2008; Coutard and Rutherford,
2010). Thirdly, it analyses the urban contex-
tualisation of energy policy, in particular
the ways in which city politics and urban
development shape energy provision and
use and, conversely, energy infrastructure
systems influence urban life (see Bulkeley
et al., 2011a, 2011b).
The paper is structured into three sections.
The first section assesses the strengths and
weaknesses of various ways of conceptualis-
ing change to urban infrastructure systems in
the literature. The second section explores
the discourses and policies surrounding
energy efficiency in Berlin from 1920 to the
present, tracing continuities and change
across highly diverse political and socioeco-
nomic contexts. The paper concludes with
reflections on how an historical study of this
kind, framed by concepts of socio-technical
change, can advance our understanding of
urban and energy transitions.
2. Conceptualising Change to
Urban Infrastructure Systems
The infrastructure systems which provide
cities with energy, water and wastewater
services have long become symbols of stabi-
lity and durability. Designed for decades,
embedded in the urban substrata and sus-
tained by complex institutional arrange-
ments, these systems conjure up notions of
immobility, obduracy and resilience
(Summerton, 1994; Hommels, 2005). Since
the 1980s, historians of technology have
come a long way in providing explanations
for the emergence and subsequent stabilisa-
tion of so-called large technical systems
(LTS), from their early beginnings in the
hands of inventors, entrepreneurs and
financiers to the large urban networks
familiar to urban landscapes today (Tarr,
1979; Hughes, 1983, 1987; Tarr and Dupuy,
1988; Melosi, 2000). Central to the obdu-
racy of these systems, recent research
agrees, are their socio-technical characteris-
tics. A socio-technical system, such as an
electricity supply network, comprises not
merely a series of physical artefacts and
technologies, but also the actors involved in
providing and using the services, institu-
tional rules and norms for operating the
systems, cultural values and the economic
resources to construct and maintain them
(Hughes, 1987; Summerton, 1994; Star,
1999). These attributes interact in a ‘seam-
less web’ to create, stabilise and, subse-
quently, sustain a particular socio-technical
configuration. Socio-technical systems
become thereby particularly prone to path
dependency: once established, they prove
intrinsically resistant to radical change.
The high degree of path dependency gen-
erally attributed to socio-technical systems
raises the question of how infrastructure sys-
tems change at all. In the literature, there
exist various ways of conceptualising socio-
technical change. For the purposes of this
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paper, we are interested in ascertaining how
they explain change and what role cities play
in their explanations.
2.1 System Evolution
Thomas Hughes’ model of system evolu-
tion, developed around his analysis of the
emergence of electricity supply in the US,
Germany and Britain, has provided a blue-
print for explaining change to large techni-
cal systems (LTS) for many historians of
technology. In its original form, Hughes’
model envisaged a linear process of emer-
gence for a LTS, beginning with invention
and development, proceeding through
innovation and competition and culminat-
ing in consolidation and rationalisation
(Hughes, 1983, pp. 14–15). Where radical
change occurs at all, it is explained as a
result of a ‘reverse salient’ requiring system
adaptation or, in extreme cases, a ‘battle of
the systems’ to decide a new development
trajectory. This model of ‘stages and ages’
has been criticised inter alia for being too
linear, for excluding perspectives beyond
the main decision-makers and for assuming
an inordinate amount of influence by the
system builders: individual inventors, engi-
neers and entrepreneurs (Joerges, 1999).
The urban dimensions to the historical
development of LTS have been the subject
of a number of seminal works (for example,
Tarr, 1979; Rosen, 1986; Tarr and Dupuy,
1988; Melosi, 2000). This literature has
demonstrated the close connectivity
between urbanisation processes, urban gov-
ernance and the emergence of modern
urban infrastructures, especially in Europe
and North America. These works have pro-
vided powerful illustrations of how pro-
cesses of network construction and
expansion were often highly contested and
inherently political. They are also valuable
for demonstrating the huge relevance of
path dependency in explaining how choices
made by past generations can limit the
options for change today (Melosi, 2005).
By virtue of increasing returns on invest-
ments, high sunk costs and institutional
‘lock-in’, socio-technical systems develop
self-reinforcing mechanisms which help to
explain why subsequent path transforma-
tion can prove so difficult (Pierson, 2000;
Melosi, 2005). More research is needed,
however, on how path dependency works
and how change occurs in specific contexts.
2.2 Reconfiguration
Social scientists researching present-day
socio-technical systems, whilst often draw-
ing on LTS terminology, generally prefer to
conceive of change as ‘reconfiguration’
(Summerton, 1994). This entails the process
by which an entrenched configuration of a
socio-technical system is opened up
(‘unbundled’) by pressures for change to
one or more of its components and becomes
restabilised around a new configuration.
The principal drivers of change addressed
are processes of liberalisation and privatisa-
tion of utility services. Socio-technical
change is conceived of here not as a transi-
tion from one path to another, but as a
largely messy, contested and discursive pro-
cess strongly framed by contexts of action
and contingent events. System reconfigura-
tion is the model most commonly referred
to by scholars interested in the interdepen-
dencies between cities and their infrastruc-
ture systems, making it the most spatially
sensitive of all explanations of socio-
technical change to date. Characteristic of
this literature is a common interest in
exploring how cities and their infrastruc-
tures co-evolve in the context of shifting
geographies of provision and consumption
(Guy et al., 2001; Bulkeley et al., 2011b).
This is most prominently illustrated by the
‘splintering urbanism’ thesis developed by
Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin (2001),
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who argue that new logics of urban and
infrastructure politics are accentuating
socio-spatial disparities in utility services.
2.3 Transitions Analysis and Management
A third body of work links insight from sci-
ence and technology studies to innovation
studies in order to explain socio-technical
dynamics and their management. The prin-
cipal framework of reference here is the
multilevel perspective (MLP) on socio-tech-
nical transition (Geels, 2002; Geels and
Kemp, 2007). MLP conceptualises change as
the result of interaction between three levels:
technological niches at the micro level,
socio-technical regimes at the meso level
and landscapes—or exogenous factors—at
the macro level. Characteristic of established
socio-technical regimes are incremental
processes of reconfiguration, as elements of
a system become realigned to accommodate
new developments. Radical innovations, by
contrast, are generated in technological
niches or by shifts in exogenous factors. The
MLP framework has been applied in a
number of historical case studies to analyse
transitions from one stable socio-technical
configuration to another. Drawing on this
conceptualisation, these and other authors
have developed a deliberative application,
termed transitions management, to seek
ways of promoting desirable transitions
(Kemp, 1994; Kemp et al., 1998; Geels,
2002). The transitions school has been sub-
jected to recent criticism for oversimplifying
processes of socio-technical transition and
playing down important aspects, such as
conflicts of interest, social equity, adaptive
capacity and discursive representations of
change (Smith and Stirling, 2008; Hodson
and Marvin, 2010a; Truffer and Coenen,
2012; Bulkeley et al., 2011b). Most signifi-
cant for our purpose is the lack of sensitivity
of MLP (despite the terminology) towards
spatial aspects, viewing cities either as
homogeneous actors of transition or as loca-
tions, or seed-beds, of innovation (Hodson
and Marvin, 2010a; Bulkeley et al., 2011b).
From this literature review, a number of
strengths of existing research on urban
socio-technical transitions of central value
to this paper can be readily identified.
These include, firstly, the importance of
historical trajectories and path dependency
to understanding options for change in the
future; secondly, the value of conceiving
socio-technical transitions as messy and
contested process of reconfiguration;
thirdly, the attraction of transitions analysis
for providing a framework for understand-
ing and promoting socio-technical change.
However, a number of other pertinent
issues, relating in particular to the ‘urban’
in socio-technical transitions, have received
far less attention to date or are formulated
as future research needs (Hodson and
Marvin, 2010b; Truffer and Coenen, 2012).
The first is how urban transitions (political,
socioeconomic or cultural) impact on
infrastructure policy. The second is how
power relationships—mediated through
institutions and infrastructures—condition
urban responses to energy or resource
needs. The third is how urban infrastruc-
ture policy gets caught up in, and shaped
by, broader, multi-scalar processes of
national or even international politics.
These three research gaps are central to the
following case study of Berlin.
3. Electricity for Berlin: The Politics
of Energy Efficiency
Contrary to popular belief, strategic interest
in energy efficiency did not first emerge in
Europe following the oil crisis of 1973. At
different times and in different contexts
before then, those responsible for providing
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energy became sensitised to the need to
operate their supply systems more effi-
ciently or encourage energy efficiency
amongst system users. Again contrary to a
common assumption, the history of elec-
tricity use in 20th century Berlin (as in
many other European cities) was not one
of continuous, uninterrupted growth.
Electricity consumption and provision fluc-
tuated sharply across the century, with
periods of stagnation or decline punctuat-
ing the expansion curve (Hellige, 1986;
Hessler, 1998). The case study addresses the
ways in which infrastructure managers
strived to influence the supply of, and
demand for, electricity in Berlin from 1920
to the present in response to shifts in the
city’s political economy. Based on an analysis
of strategy documents, policy statements and
contemporary publications—including a sys-
tematic study of professional journals—it
plots continuity and change in policies relat-
ing to energy efficiency. Although the per-
spective studied is restricted to that of
infrastructure managers in the city’s power
utilities and administration, we consider not
only the supply side of the equation, but also
how they attempted to shape demand for the
energy services they provided.
3.1 Discovering Load Management in
Weimar Berlin
The creation of Greater Berlin in 1920,
increasing the city’s territory 13-fold and
nearly doubling its population to almost
four million, coincided with a dramatic
increase in electricity consumption. The
city’s own power utility Bewag (Berliner
Kraft- und Licht-Aktiengesellschaft), respon-
sible for providing around 90 per cent of
Berlin’s electricity at that time, supplied 338
gigawatt hours (gWh) in 1920. By 1925 this
had risen to 662 gWh and by 1929, at the
start of the Depression, the figure had
doubled again to 1324 gWh (Rehmer, 1934,
p. 1; Hughes, 1983, p. 190). Such rapid
growth was attributable to the increasing use
of electricity not only in industrial produc-
tion, but also by households. This is reflected
in the sharp rise in connection rates to the
electricity supply system in Berlin at this time,
from 11 per cent of all households in 1922 to
25 per cent in 1925, 60 per cent in 1929 and
76 per cent by 1933 (Czada, 1969, p. 156).
With growth curves like these—and looking
to even higher levels of electrification in US
cities—Bewag officials responded by substan-
tially extending the utility’s generating capac-
ity, funded largely with loans from abroad
(Bewag, 1928; Ru¨ckwardt and Albrecht,
1929). Whilst argued as a logical step to meet
growing demand, the investment in new
power stations was also designed to reduce
the municipal company’s dependence on
electricity bought from large state-run elec-
tricity utilities (Leitha¨user, 1959, p. 209; see
also Hughes, 1983).
At the same time as Bewag was extending
its generating capacity it was discovering
the benefits of encouraging the household
consumer to use electricity for cooking,
heating and other functions (Hessler,
1998). A period of deflation following the
stabilisation of the Reichsmark in late 1924
gave rise to concerns that industrial electric-
ity demand would lag seriously behind
growth projections. To meet this antici-
pated shortfall Bewag introduced in 1926 a
novel scheme for hire purchase of electrical
household appliances in Berlin. Under this
scheme, called ‘‘Elektrissima’’, the customer
paid for electrical goods in monthly instal-
ments and Bewag paid a small subsidy
(between 5 per cent and 10 per cent) to the
retailer (Kauffmann, 1927). The scheme
also applied to installing electricity to resi-
dential properties not yet connected. The
utility made no bones about its aim to sti-
mulate demand for its product
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Bewag hopes . that this easing of payments
for the consumer on this unprecedented and
improved scale will result in a substantial
increase in consumption of electricity
(Kauffmann, 1927, p. 83).1
Very soon, however, the ability to influence
demand for electricity was being used not to
increase consumption per se, but to direct it
to periods of the day and the year when the
power stations were not operating near full
capacity. In a major strategy document of
1927, setting out Berlin’s electricity supply
for the following five years, considerable
attention was paid to ways of using prices
and advertising to balance the load curves
(Bewag, 1928). A special night rate of eight
Pfennig per kWH (half the daily rate) was
introduced to stimulate night-time con-
sumption. Yet, in the absence of smart
meters capable of more refined time-pric-
ing, it was to advertising that the utility
looked primarily to ‘‘reduce the size of the
gap between the three load periods by sti-
mulating additional consumption’’ (Bewag
1928, p. 10). The advertising campaign dis-
couraged electricity use at peak periods but
targeted primarily night uses, such as stor-
age for warm water, street lighting, refrig-
eration and—intriguingly from today’s
perspective—batteries for electrical vehicles.
The economic depression of 1929–33
prompted a sharp decline in electricity con-
sumption across Germany, resulting for the
first time in problems of underutilisation of
generating capacity (Hellige, 1986, p. 126).
Bewag’s electricity sales fell by nearly 20 per
cent from a peak of 1324 gWh in 1929 to
1068 gWh in 1932 (Rehmer, 1934, p. 1). As
industrial demand dropped sharply, house-
hold consumption took on additional
importance, as the following statement by
Bewag’s chief engineer testifies
If electricity utilities are paying increasing
attention to households, this is because the
demand from households not only has huge
potential but also represents a market which
is almost entirely unaffected by shifts in the
economy and can therefore provide a valu-
able basis for the efficiency of power stations
in times of economic depression (Ru¨ckwardt
and Albrecht, 1929, p. 521).
3.2 Managing Electricity in the Nazi Cause
On coming to power in January 1933, nei-
ther Hitler nor his National Socialist
Workers’ Party (NSDAP) had a coherent
energy policy (Hellige, 1986). In the
absence of clear direction from either party
or government, various energy interest
groups argued their case in terms deemed
likely to appeal to one or more strands of
the Nazi party’s contradictory ideology.
Local power utilities, backed by the munici-
pal wing of the NSDAP, pressed the gov-
ernment to limit the expansion of the
major power generation companies, playing
to anti-capitalist sentiments in the party.
Some urged the government to promote
new, small technologies, such as combined
heat and power or wind energy, in the
interest of energy efficiency and national
autarky. However, the major power utili-
ties, led by RWE, Preussenelektra and
Bayernwerk and backed by a powerful, cen-
tralist lobby within the NSDAP, proved far
more influential, having a determining
influence on the Energy Law of 1935. This
law set the institutional framework for
centralising and concentrating Germany’s
energy systems, building up supply capacity
around large power plants and regulating
prices to stimulate electricity consumption
(Hellige, 1986, pp. 138–145).
Programmes to encourage household
electricity consumption, such as the
‘‘Elekrissima’’ scheme in Berlin, were con-
tinued after 1933, but took on new ratio-
nales in response to shifting political
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priorities. The interest of the power utility,
Bewag, to balance demand loads by stimu-
lating more electricity use out of peak peri-
ods remained, initially, an important
motive. The monthly magazine of the uti-
lity’s NS-run works association, Der
Stromkreis, was full of articles in the mid
1930s reporting the apparent success of the
electrification programme, sales of electrical
appliances and demonstration showrooms.
As Martina Hessler has argued, the success
of Nazi consumer politics lay less in dissemi-
nating new technology and more in helping
to stabilise the new regime, creating images
of what the modern German—and, in par-
ticular, the modern German woman—
should be doing (Hessler, 2001). The adver-
tising campaigns addressed consumption
not just as a pleasure, but also as a duty. This
duty was, in the early years, to support the
recovery of the German economy by buying
electrical appliances and consuming more
electricity. In a series of advertising cam-
paigns—termed, ominously, ‘attack waves’
by the Bewag’s new director Carl Krecke—
Berliners were called upon to do their bit for
the national economic cause
One of the best means of providing the many
unemployed with bread and work is compre-
hensive electrification: there should be no
home without electricity, no attics, no stair-
wells without electrical lighting (advert cited
in Lawaczek, 1934, p. 270).
By buying electrical appliances, Germans
were encouraged to believe they were serving
the Volk and Vaterland. Advertising for elec-
tric refrigerators—under the slogan ‘‘fight
the mould’’ (‘‘Kampf dem Verderb’’)—
argued the need to save food as a means of
reducing imports and strengthening
national autarky (Hessler, 2001, p. 217).
Equating electricity provision and use
with the national interest was reflected not
only in advertising campaigns, but also in
policy statements and publications elevat-
ing electricity, and energy in general, to a
public good. Setting electricity up as a ser-
vice in the common interest (Gemeinnutz),
rather than private interest (Eigennutz), was
a powerful argumentative tool, buying in to
the Nazi ideology of subordination of the
individual to the Volk. The common inter-
est at stake was a national resource for all
to protect. In a keynote speech in October
1937, the Bewag director Carl Krecke, then
head of the Reich Group for Energy, set out
this line of Nazi energy policy with refer-
ence to its military implications
Any failure of our energy supply could, under
certain circumstances, throw into question
the success of the efforts and sacrifice of the
German Volk in fighting for its economic
freedom (Krecke, 1937, p. 380).
3.3 War and Destruction: Saving Energy to
Secure Supply
The military preparedness of national elec-
tricity supply became a political issue soon
after the Nazis came to power. In the
autumn of 1933, Sub-division IIIB of the
Political Central Commission of the NSDAP
declared that national defence was ‘‘an open
wound in the body of the electricity indus-
try’’ and that making the energy sector
‘‘capable of war’’ had top priority (cited in
Leitha¨user, 1959, p. 217). In Berlin, in the
same year, Bewag responded by setting up
an air-raid unit to provide both physical
and organisational protection for its plant
and workforce from aerial bombardment
(Wellmann, 1933).
Energy efficiency to support the war
effort became a cornerstone of energy
policy in Berlin and in Germany as a whole.
Interest in resource efficiency was not new
to Nazi planners. The four-year plan of
1936 had been designed to increase national
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self-sufficiency by reducing dependency on
imports, such as oil. This had spawned
research and investment in a variety of
novel technologies to extract material and
energy from waste products. For example,
Berlin’s wastewater utility used motor oil
and methane gas derived from wastewater
to run its vehicle fleet and heat its buildings
(Pallasch, 1937). However, it was only
during the war that the more rational use
of energy became a dominant theme in
policy statements, professional publications
and advertising campaigns. On his appoint-
ment as Inspector General of Water and
Energy in June 1941, Fritz Todt set out his
priorities for a reorientation of German
energy policy around hydro-electric power,
combined heat and power and district heat-
ing systems, saving coal reserves for chemi-
cal applications and military purposes.2
Besides looking to other, more efficient—
and available—sources of energy, the gov-
ernment introduced an energy saving plan
to be implemented by so-called energy engi-
neers, whose job it was to maximise energy
efficiency in all large factories. The ultimate
military purpose of saving energy was made
perfectly clear at the time
This is the value of the energy saving plan: an
initiative of the whole Volk, which causes a
minimum of inconvenience to restore favour-
able conditions for producing more weapons
(Ruhstrat, 1942, p. 423).
That any energy saved went to serve the
armaments industry is reflected in the rapid
increase in electricity consumption well
into the war. Despite restrictions on street
and household lighting and a decline in the
city’s population following mobilisation,
electricity use in Berlin peaked in 1942 at
732 kWh per capita (Leitha¨user, 1959,
p. 219). Under the slogan ‘‘the electricity
you save is working for victory’’, the city’s
remaining inhabitants were called upon to
make yet another sacrifice to ensure the
‘‘final victory’’ (Bezirksamt Charlottenburg
von Berlin, 1990, p. 48).
From the winter of 1941/42 onwards,
aerial bombardment did cause major, tem-
porary disruptions to electricity distribution
in the city, but the power stations themselves
were not targeted specifically. Astonishingly,
only one of the six power stations in Berlin
was bombed—a fact which the later director
of the East Berlin power utility, Hans Witte,
mischievously put down to the Allies delib-
erately avoiding damage to plant funded in
the 1920s with their own loans (Witte, 1952,
p. 1).
Ironically, the only time the whole of the
city was without electricity completely was
for 24 hours following the Soviet occupation
of the city’s power stations on 27 April 1945.
In the subsequent months, before the arrival
of the Allied forces in Berlin, the Soviet
authorities dismantled generating plant and
transported it—as de facto reparations—to
the Soviet Union. They took care to ensure
that most of the plant dismantled was in one
of the three sectors of the city to be occupied
by the Western powers. As a result, the gen-
erating capacity of the whole city was
reduced by almost one half and of West
Berlin by 90 per cent (Brocke and Bru¨ss,
1953, p. 113). The consequence was, inevita-
bly, a major shortage of electricity for the
initial post-war years, requiring a strict
regime of electricity rationing imposed by
the occupying forces. Electricity for lighting
was limited to 500 Wh per day and meter
plus 50 Wh per person and for cooking to
1.2 kWh per day and meter plus 200 Wh per
person (Bewag, 1984). Anyone exceeding
these limits was subject to harsh penalties.
Nevertheless many did so, incurring some
57,600 fines by the end of 1946. Others
resorted to less scrupulous means, such as
using an implement—familiarly known as
the ‘Little Gustav’—to run electricity meters
backwards.
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3.4 Socialist Rationalisation in East Berlin
The political division of Berlin, in conjunc-
tion with the creation of two separate
states—the Federal Republic of Germany
and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR)—in 1949, was pre-empted by the
blockade of West Berlin, an event precipi-
tated by the Soviet authorities severing elec-
tricity and coal supplies to the western half
of the city in June 1948 (Moss, 2009).
Parallel to the physical truncation of its
power supply networks, the Berlin blockade
heralded the organisational division of the
city’s electricity utility into Bewag (West)
and Bewag-East (Merritt, 1968, pp. 172–
177).
The blockade and subsequent division of
the city affected electricity supply in East
Berlin far less than in the West. Most of the
city’s coal reserves were at the time stored at
power plants in the eastern half of the city
(Merritt, 1968, p. 170). In the early years of
division, East Berlin’s power stations were
able to provide for all its electricity needs,
even exporting electricity to the rest of the
GDR (Witte, 1952, p. 3). It was with some
satisfaction, therefore, that the director of
Bewag-East, HansWitte, announced in 1952
The purpose of a good electricity system must
be to provide every inhabitant and every fac-
tory with as much electricity as they need to
live comfortably or to meet production tar-
gets. For this purpose 1000 kWh per annum
and capita are regarded as sufficient (Witte,
1952, p. 32).
Such an ambitious consumption target—a
third higher than Berlin’s peak rate of
1942—was an open declaration of the
return to equating modernisation with high
electricity consumption. The statement was
also intended to publicise one area where
East Berlin had a distinct advantage over
West Berlin.
However, as generating capacity in East
Berlin, and the GDR generally, failed to
keep pace with rising consumption levels
during the course of the 1950s, the issue of
rational energy use re-emerged on the
political agenda. As part of the first five-
year plan a campaign was launched to save
electricity which could be redirected to pri-
ority sectors of the economy, primarily
heavy industry. Similar to the 1940s, energy
inspectors (Energiewarte) were sent into
factories, analysing energy use, making rec-
ommendations and checking whether the
targets for energy saving were met. Bewag-
East rewarded units, such as the ‘red shift
brigade’, for exceeding national targets to
save electricity (SED-Betriebsorganisation
Bewag, 1975, p. 94). It was argued by those
responsible that energy saving was in the
common interest and therefore should be
easier to implement in a socialist state
(Pelka, 1952). Complaints at the lack of
support the energy inspectors were receiv-
ing and the lack of influence they were
having suggest that this assumption was
overoptimistic. In practice, the state plan-
ning system of electricity supply, based
around huge lignite-fired power stations
and state-owned utilities, ensured a highly
centralised, energy-intensive and supply-
oriented system of energy provision with
the highest per capita CO2 emissions in the
world (Mez et al., 1991, pp. 102–104). By
the time the Berlin Wall fell, the East Berlin
utility was drawing 77 per cent of its elec-
tricity from the GDR grid (Monstadt, 2004,
p. 289).
3.5 Between Expansionism and
Environmentalism in West Berlin
In many ways, West Berlin’s experience of
electricity availability was the mirror image
of the East Berlin story. The truncation of
supplies of electricity and coal from the
Soviet sector and zone in June 1948 plunged
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West Berlin into an unprecedented supply
crisis. In response to the blockade the Allies
rapidly established an airlift, flying in essen-
tial supplies to the beleaguered city, above
all coal to keep the power stations in opera-
tion, but also electricity generators. In an
impassioned appeal, Councillor Ernst
Reuter called on West Berliners to radically
reduce their energy use
Every kilowatt hour of electricity, every cubic
metre of gas and every litre of water which is
taken from our supply pipes costs coal. And
new coal can only be provided by air (quoted
in Senat von Berlin, 1964, p. 1482).
In the winter of 1948/49, West Berliners had
on average only two hours of electricity
during the day and two hours at night. Their
per capita consumption fell as a result to a
mere quarter of East Berlin levels. Following
the end of the blockade on 12 May 1949,
West Berlin was able to reach a number of
agreements on the delivery of electricity
from East Berlin. However, none of these
proved reliable. In March 1952, Bewag-East
precipitated the termination of all electricity
supplies to West Berlin. From then until
German reunification West Berlin was to
remain an ‘electricity island’, cut off from
the national and regional grids of both West
and East Germany (Merritt, 1968; Varchmin
and Schubert, 1988; Bewag, 1991).
It is against this prolonged and bitter
experience of system vulnerability that West
Berlin’s subsequent strategy of expanding its
electricity generating capacity as much and
as fast as possible needs to be understood. It
was no coincidence that one of the first acts
of Councillor Reuter following the end of
the blockade was to call for the reconstruc-
tion of the city’s main power station,
Kraftwerk West, as a deterrent against simi-
lar Soviet interventions in the future (Senat
von Berlin, 1964, p. 1554). By 1952, this
flagship power station had been restored to
a capacity of 268 MW, already providing
the lion’s share of the total 382 MW at West
Berlin’s disposal (Brocke and Bru¨ss, 1953,
p. 114). By early 1955, within an extraordi-
narily short period of time, Bewag-West
had become self-sufficient in electricity gen-
eration, largely thanks to credits to fund
capital investments from the European
Recovery Programme.
As West Berlin’s economy recovered,
electricity consumption in the city soared.
In 1952 it stood at a lowly 1000 gWh but
increased sharply and continuously to
approximately 10,500 gWh by 1990
(Ziesing, 1985, p. 236; Bewag, 1991, p. 8).
This increase in electricity consumption
was linked not only to economic recovery,
but also to sales of electrical goods. Bewag
reintroduced the ‘‘Elektrissima’’ hire pur-
chase scheme to great effect. By 1966, the
scheme had half a million customers on its
books and had made sales totalling 170
million DM (Bezirksamt Charlottenburg,
1990, p. 46). That Bewag-West was keen to
encourage household electricity consump-
tion is indicative of its confidence in being
able to generate enough power to meet
demand. It can also be attributed to the
fact that rising consumption levels brought
increased revenue and profits for the com-
pany and the West Berlin government, the
majority shareholder.
There is no indication that Bewag-West
seriously considered saving energy and curb-
ing demand as a way of helping to secure
electricity supply in its precarious insular sit-
uation. It continuously defied political pres-
sure to promote demand-side management
and renewable energies (Monstadt, 2007,
p. 329). This is all the more surprising since
the utility—by virtue of being separated
from national grids—had to build up
reserves of generating capacity far in excess
of conventional levels and had to rely on
expensive imported coal. On several occa-
sions, capacity was pushed to the limit, as in
1442 TIMOTHY MOSS
the summer of 1982 following a fire at one of
the power stations and during the harsh
winter of 1986/87.
It took a number of protests against the
construction of new power stations in the
city together with the oil crisis in 1973 for
Bewag-West to reconsider its expansionist
strategy, albeit in a modest way (Monstadt,
2004, pp. 280ff). The company began advis-
ing on energy saving and alternative forms
of energy, such as heat pumps and solar col-
lectors. More effort was put into expanding
the district heating network, exploiting the
central location of many of its co-generating
power stations. By 1988, 17 per cent of heat-
ing in West Berlin was provided by district
heating systems, compared with eight per cent
in West Germany (Varchmin and Schubert,
1988, p. 24). However, the city authorities—
echoing the utility—were sceptical about the
possibilities of saving electricity
reducing peak loads by means of efficient and
rational electricity use are—given the con-
sumption conditions in Berlin—barely possible
(Presse- und Informationsamt, 1978, p. 10).
A radical policy change was heralded in
1989, with the election of the city’s first
social democratic–green coalition, which
created an energy task force to promote
more efficient power stations, renewable
energies and demand-side management
and, in 1990, a new state Energy Law setting
out an institutional framework for energy
planning (Monstadt, 2007, p. 329).
3.6 Post-1990 Reconfiguration
However, within months of the red–green
coalition coming to power, the Berlin Wall
fell, causing the city’s emergent energy policy
to be overshadowed by the pressing require-
ments to reconnect the energy systems of
East and West Berlin, amalgamate the two
power utilities, link the West Berlin network
to the national grid and modernise the East
Berlin network (Bewag, 1991; Monstadt,
2004, pp. 298ff). Parallel to these Berlin-spe-
cific tasks, responses were needed to broader
drivers of change in Germany: the liberalisa-
tion of electricity markets and privatisation
of electricity utilities, political pressure for
ecological modernisation and the viability of
new energy technologies (Monstadt, 2007).
Policies to promote energy efficiency in a
reunified Berlin were framed by the opening
up of the city’s electricity market to competi-
tion, the emergence of new actors providing
energy services and, in 1997, the complete
privatisation of Bewag.
The conservative–social democratic gov-
ernment formed in 1990 pursued the energy
policy path set out by its red–green prede-
cessor, but with far less enthusiasm. The
Energy Concept for Berlin of 1994 targeted
a 25 per cent reduction in CO2 emissions
between 1990 and 2010 and included an
energy-saving action plan, covering hous-
ing, public buildings, transport, energy ser-
vices and renewable energies (Monstadt,
2004, pp. 313–314). However, the city gov-
ernment was not prepared to force Bewag
to prioritise energy efficiency. In the
absence of serious regulatory pressure on its
own utility, the Berlin government resorted
to public funding for projects planned
under the Energy Concept. When the city
ran into massive debt from 1992 onwards,
funding for these projects dropped sharply.
Henceforth, the city relied increasingly on
private contractors to implement its energy-
saving programmes—to limited effect. One
of the few projects to enjoy modest success
was a scheme to increase energy efficiency
and reduce energy costs in public buildings
by pooling lucrative and less lucrative build-
ings in contracts to private energy service
companies. Between 1995 and 2005 some
500 buildings were renovated under the
scheme, but this fell well below the original
target (Monstadt, 2007, p. 331). In 2010,
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under a social democratic–socialist party
coalition, the city government adopted a
new Energy Concept targeting a 40 per cent
reduction in CO2 emissions by 2020. The
city aims to set new standards for sustain-
able urban energy policy in promoting
greater energy efficiency and renewable
energies (Senatsverwaltung fu¨r Wirtschaft,
Technologie und Frauen, 2011, p. 4). The
strong path dependency of Berlin’s energy
policy following reunification (Monstadt,
2004, pp. 493–496) cautions, however,
against overoptimistic expectations of a
strategic shift in direction.
4. Conclusions
This paper set out to challenge oversimplis-
tic notions of energy transitions in cities as
straightforward shifts from a supply-
oriented, fossil-based system to a low-
carbon, energy-efficient one. Rather than
following a single technological innovation
or focusing on a particular energy transi-
tion, we took a long-term perspective on
the shifting context of energy efficiency in
Berlin in order to illustrate how urban
transitions can influence energy policy and
practice. Given Berlin’s history of repeated
and radical regime change across the 20th
century, our interest lay in revealing what
impact different political regimes and
socioeconomic circumstances had on the
way energy efficiency was discussed and
pursued. This case study was set in the con-
text of recent research on socio-technical
transitions in cities with a view to identify-
ing research gaps which it could address.
We conclude the paper by summarising
how the findings from the Berlin case build
on, and add to, this knowledge.
Firstly, the Berlin case reveals that energy
efficiency strategies have a long pedigree,
beginning well before the 1973 oil crisis, but
that they were highly fluid, emerging in
situations of perceived or feared electricity
shortage only to disappear again at times of
adequate supply capacity. This provides an
interesting lesson in the non-linearity and
expediency of shifts in socio-technical con-
figurations. The predominant concern was
always for the effective operation of the elec-
tricity supply networks, rather than the effi-
cient use of energy. Only when the latter
contributed to the former did it enjoy (brief)
political support. The persistence of this
supply-oriented logic across democratic,
dictatorial and state-socialist regimes illus-
trates the importance of taking a long-term
perspective on potential path dependencies
when analysing energy transitions. It also
suggests that any future energy transition
which challenges this dominant logic is
likely to be messy and contested, rather than
neat and straightforward.
Secondly, the Berlin case illustrates how
efforts to shape demand for electricity can
be put to very different purposes, depending
on the context. The hire purchase scheme
‘‘Elektrissima’’ was actively promoted under
three different political regimes. It was
introduced in Weimar Berlin initially to
support electrification and was subsequently
refined as an instrument of load manage-
ment to direct electricity use to off-peak
periods. During the Depression, it became
used to offset a drop in demand by industry
and, under the Nazis, to stimulate job cre-
ation in the electrical industry. When power
generation systems were unable to meet
demand, in particular during the war and
afterwards in both West and East Berlin,
advertising, public appeals and even fines
were used to encourage lower electricity
consumption. Together, these instances of
demand management illustrate the high
degree of context-dependency of Berlin’s
energy efficiency strategies. They are indica-
tive of the multiple geographies of such con-
texts. As the Berlin example illustrates, the
spatial factors influencing the development
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of an electricity supply system are not just
material, technical or environmental, as
might be expected, but are often also social,
economic and political. They can also span
multiple scalar levels, from the local to the
global. Importantly, such spatial factors act
not simply as a contextual backdrop for
energy policy, but as constitutive elements
of change and continuity to urban energy
systems.
Thirdly, the political nature of energy
policy has been a leitmotif of the case study.
Efforts to promote energy efficiency in
Berlin have been inextricably tied up in, for
instance, the vo¨lkisch ideology of the Nazi
regime, the geo-politics of post-war divi-
sion, the liberalisation of energy markets in
Europe and the global discourse on climate
change today. Berlin’s electricity supply
system was, however, not simply a product,
but also a medium of the city’s political
economy. It was actively enrolled in sup-
porting important political objectives of
each regime, whether the modernisation
agenda of Weimar Berlin, national autarky
in the ‘Third Reich’, consolidating socialism
in the GDR or greening the economy in a
reunified Berlin. A good example is the
diversity of political motives underpinning
the quest for ‘energy security’ under differ-
ent regimes. In 1920s Berlin, energy security
was about providing adequate generating
capacity to meet spiralling demand. To the
Nazi regime, it meant inter alia protecting
energy infrastructures from aerial bombard-
ment. To West Berliners during and after
the blockade of 1948/49, it meant being self-
sufficient in electricity generation. Today,
energy security covers issues ranging from
responsiveness to climate change to protec-
tion from terrorist attacks. Deconstructing
the notion of energy management as being
something politically neutral is crucial to
understanding what role power relations
can play in advancing and constraining
socio-technical transitions.
To conclude, Berlin’s historical experi-
ence of energy efficiency suggests that we
need to pay greater attention in future
research to how different components of a
socio-technical system change at different
speeds and different times. We also need to
consider more closely how socio-technical
transitions are constructed by different
actors, what diverse motives they embody
and whose interests they serve. Above all,
we require a better grasp of the multiple
geographies of socio-technical transitions—
political, socioeconomic and cultural, as well
as material, technical and environmental—
and how they shape, and are shaped by,
energy policy.
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